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Abstract
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are widely used to exchange content
over the Internet. Knowledge on paedophile activity in such networks
remains limited while it has important social consequences. Moreover,
though there are different P2P systems in use, previous academic works
on this topic focused on one system at a time and their results are not
directly comparable.
We design a methodology for comparing KAD and eDonkey, two
P2P systems among the most prominent ones and with different ano-
nymity levels. We monitor two eDonkey servers and the KAD network
during several days and record hundreds of thousands of keyword-
based queries. We detect paedophile-related queries with a previously
validated tool and we propose, for the first time, a large-scale compar-
ison of paedophile activity in two different P2P systems. We conclude
that there are significantly fewer paedophile queries in KAD than in
eDonkey (approximately 0.09% vs 0.25%).
1 Introduction
Paedophile activity is a crucial social issue and is often claimed to be preva-
lent in peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing systems [3, 7]. However, current know-
ledge on paedophile activity in these networks remains very limited. Recently,
research works have been conducted to improve this situation by quantifying
paedophile activity in Gnutella and eDonkey, two of the main P2P systems
currently deployed [5, 6]. They respectively conclude that 1.6% and 0.25%
of queries are of paedophile nature, but these numbers are not directly com-
parable as the authors use very different definitions and methods. Such
comparisons are of high interest though, since differences in features of P2P
systems, such as the level of anonymity they provide, may influence their
appeal for paedophile users.
In this paper, we perform for the first time such a comparison. We focus
on the KAD and eDonkey P2P systems, which are both widely used and differ
significantly in their architecture: while eDonkey relies on a few servers, KAD
is fully distributed. This lack of centralisation may lead users to assume that
KAD provides a much higher level of anonymity than eDonkey. Comparing
the two systems sheds light on the influence of a distributed architecture on
paedophile behavior and increases general knowledge on paedophile activity
in P2P systems.
Section 2 describes our datasets and how we collected them. Section 3
presents our comparison of the amount of paedophile queries in KAD and
eDonkey. Section 4 focuses on an important feature of paedophile activity:
ages entered in queries. Finally, in Section 5 we infer the fraction of pae-
dophile queries in KAD from the one in eDonkey, and Section 6 presents our
conclusions.
2 Datasets and measurements
In order to compare paedophile activity in two different P2P systems, we
first need appropriate datasets, the collection of which is a challenge in itself.
In KAD and eDonkey, different kinds of measurements are possible.
In eDonkey, servers index files and providers for these files, and users
submit keyword-based queries to servers to seek files of interest to them [4].
By monitoring such a server, one may collect all those queries [1]. Here, we
record all queries received by two of the largest eDonkey servers during a
three-month period in 2010. The servers are located in different countries
(France and Ukraine) and have different filtering policies: the French server
indexes only non-copyrighted material, while the Ukrainian server openly
indexes all submitted files. Monitoring two such different servers will allow
us to compare them in order to know if server policy impacts our results.
To collect KAD data, we use the HAMACK monitoring architecture [2],
which makes it possible to record the queries related to a given keyword by in-
serting distributed probes close to the keyword ID onto the KAD distributed
hash table. We supervise 72 keywords, which we choose to span well the vari-
ety of search requests entered in the system, with a focus on paedophile activ-
ity: a set of 19 paedophile keywords (babyj, babyshivid, childlover, childporn,
hussyfan, kidzilla, kingpass, mafiasex, pedo, pedofilia, pedofilo, pedoland, pe-
dophile, pthc, ptsc, qqaazz, raygold, yamad, youngvideomodels), which are
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known to be directly and unambiguously related to paedophile activity in
P2P networks; a set of 23 mixed keywords (1yo, 2yo, 3yo, 4yo, 5yo, 6yo,
7yo, 8yo, 9yo, 10yo, 11yo, 12yo, 13yo, 14yo, 15yo, 16yo, boy, girl, mom,
preteen, rape, sex, webcam) frequently used in paedophile queries but also
in other contexts (for instance, Nyo stands for N years old and is used by
both paedophile users and parents seeking games for children of this age);
and a set of 30 not paedophile keywords (avi, black, christina, christmas,
day, doing, dvdrip, early, flowers, grosse, hot, house, housewives, live, love,
madonna, man, new, nokia, pokemon, rar, remix, rock, saison, smallville,
soundtrack, virtual, vista, windows, world) used as a test group and a priori
rarely used in paedophile queries. The sets of keywords result of the work on
paedophile query detection presented in [6]. Notice that our set of keywords
contains mainly common English words (love, early, flowers), but some are in
other languages (saison, pedofilia), and some are also brand names (pokemon,
nokia).
Because of the differences in architectures of the two networks and of the
measurement methodologies, we obtained very different datasets, which are
not directly comparable: in eDonkey, we observe all queries from a subset of
users whereas in KAD we only observe queries related to a given keyword,
but from all users. In addition, based on various versions of KAD clients, the
measurement tool only records the queries containing a monitored keyword
placed in first position or being the longest in the query. As a consequence,
with a short keyword such as avi, a name extension for video files, we almost
only record queries in which it is the unique keyword, because otherwise it
most likely is neither the longest nor the first word in any query. In order to
obtain comparable datasets, we therefore limit our study to a subset of our
datasets: the queries composed of exactly one word among the 72 keywords
we monitor.
As a result of this construction process, we obtain three datasets, which
we call edonkeyFR, edonkeyUA and KAD. They contain 241,152, 166,154
and 250,000 queries respectively, all consisting of a unique keyword from our
list of 72 monitored keywords, which ensures that they are comparable. The
server corresponding to the edonkeyFR dataset is located in France, while
the one corresponding to edonkeyUA is in Ukraine. Notice moreover that
their large sizes make us confident in the reliability of our statistical results
presented hereafter.
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3 Amount of paedophile queries in eDonkey
versus KAD
The most straightforward way to compare the paedophile activity in different
systems certainly is to compare the fraction of paedophile queries in each sys-
tem. Figure 1 presents the fraction of queries for each category of keywords.
This plot clearly shows that there are very distinct search behaviors in the
two networks, since values obtained for the paedophile and not paedophile
categories significantly differ between KAD and the two eDonkey datasets.
More surprisingly, the fraction of paedophile queries is significantly lower in
KAD than in eDonkey which is in sharp contradiction with previous intuition,
as KAD is assumed to provide a higher level of anonymity. The plot also
shows that values obtained for the two eDonkey servers are similar, which
indicates that very different filtering policies have no significant influence on
the amount of paedophile queries.
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Figure 1: Fraction of queries of each kind in our three datasets.
In order to gain a more detailed insight on this phenomenon, we study
the frequencies of each keyword separately in the three datasets. As we want
to explore possible correlations between the paedophile nature of a keyword
and its frequency, we need a way to quantify the paedophile nature of a
keyword. To do so, we use the 28-week dataset and the paedophile query
detection tool presented in [6], which divides a dataset between paedophile
and not paedophile queries. We denote by Q the whole dataset of queries, and
by Q(k) the set of queries containing a given keyword k. For each keyword
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k, we obtain Q(k) = N(k) + P (k), where N(k) and P (k) are the subset
of queries containing keyword k and tagged as not paedophile or paedophile,
respectively. We then define the paedophile coefficient pi(k) of keyword k
as: pi(k) = |P (k)|
|Q(k)|
. If all the queries with keyword k are paedophile queries,
pi(k) = 1, and if none of them are, pi(k) = 0. All keywords in the not
paedophile category have a paedophile coefficient below 0.006. For keywords
in the mixed category, the paedophile coefficient is above 0.01 and below 0.4.
All paedophile keywords but one have a paedophile coefficient above 0.85.
Finally, we plot in Figure 2 the ratios
feDonkeyFR(k)
fkad(k)
and
feDonkeyUA(k)
fkad(k)
, where
fs(k) denotes the frequency of queries composed of keyword k in the dataset
s, for each of our 72 keywords. We rank keywords on the horizontal axis in
increasing order of paedophile coefficient. The horizontal line represents y =
1, which enables a visual comparison of the values: if the point is below the
line, then the keyword is more frequent in KAD, otherwise it is more frequent
in the eDonkey dataset.
This plot gives a clear evidence for a correlation between the paedophile
nature of a keyword and its higher presence in eDonkey than in KAD. In
addition, the frequencies in both eDonkey datasets are very similar for the
vast majority of keywords.
We therefore conclude that anonymity is not the prevailing factor when
paedophile users choose a network, since neither the decentralised architec-
ture of KAD nor the different filtering policies increase the frequency of pae-
dophile queries. Instead, the frequency of paedophile queries is even higher
in eDonkey than in KAD. Finding an explanation for this unexpected phe-
nomenon is still an open question. The higher technical skills required to
use KAD may be part of the explanation. Users may also search content
on eDonkey while protecting their privacy with other tools, such as Virtual
Private Networks or TOR [9]. The fact that in KAD search requests are sent
over UDP and cannot benefit from TOR anonymisation could explain the
difference in the network usage.
4 Ages indicators in queries
A way to gain more insight on observed paedophile activity is to study the
distribution of age indicators in queries [8]. Notice that age indicators are
sometimes used in other contexts than paedophile activity, especially when
parents seek content suitable for children of a certain age. However, one
can observe on Figure 2 that ages indicators have similar behavior to those
obtained for the paedophile group, and are therefore closely related to the
topic.
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Figure 2: Ratio of keyword frequencies in eDonkey vs KAD. Keywords
are ranked in increasing order of paedophile coefficient. Points above the
y = 1 horizontal line indicates keywords more frequent in the corresponding
eDonkey dataset; below the line keywords are more frequent in KAD.
We plot the distribution of age indicators on Figure 3: for each integer
n lower than 17, we plot the number of queries of the form nyo in each
dataset (yo stands for years old). The three plots have similar shape, with
mostly increasing values from 1 to 10, a little drop at 11, a peak at 12 and
a fall from 13 to 16. These values for KAD are below the values for the
eDonkey servers, which is due to the fact that this dataset is a bit smaller
than others and that paedophile queries are rarer in it. The key point here
is that the distributions are very similar in all three datasets. This indicates
that, although the amount of paedophile activity varies between systems, its
nature is similar, at least regarding ages.
5 Quantifying paedophile activity in KAD
In [6], the authors establish a method to quantify the fraction of paedophile
queries in eDonkey. It relies on a tool able to accurately tag queries as
paedophile or not, and on an estimate of the error rate of this tool. Such an
approach cannot directly be applied to KAD though, as only a small (and
biased) fraction of all queries may be observed in this system. We however
show in this section how to derive the fraction of paedophile queries in KAD
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Figure 3: Distribution of age indicators in our three datasets.
from the one in eDonkey.
In a given system, eDonkey or KAD here, we consider different sets of
queries and we denote by Q the set of all queries, P the subset of paedophile
queries in Q, Q the subset of queries composed of one word among the
72 monitored keywords, P the subset of paedophile queries with one word,
i.e. consisting of one of the 19 monitored paedophile keywords (and so:
P = Q ∩ P ). Figure 4 illustrates our notations.
Q
Q
P
P
Figure 4: The different sets of queries we define for each considered dataset.
In both our eDonkeymeasurements, |P | and |Q|may be directly estimated
[6] and one can then obtain the fraction |P |
|Q|
of paedophile queries in the
dataset. We give the results for our two measurements in Table 1. On the
contrary, in KAD, one may only estimate |P | and |Q|.
However, we define α = |Q|−|P |
|Q|−|P |
and β = |P |
|P |
, which capture the probability
for a non paedophile query, respectively paedophile, to make a query of one
word among one of our monitored keywords. Given the definition of α and
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dataset |P |
|Q|
|P | |Q| α β
edonkeyFR 2.554 · 10−3 74,557 241,152 1.431 · 10−3 0.2502
edonkeyUA 2.668 · 10−3 46,763 166,154 1.538 · 10−3 0.2251
KAD n/a 30,821 250,000 n/a n/a
Table 1: Main features of the three datasets.
β, there is no a priori reason to assume that they have significantly different
values between eDonkey and KAD. From the definitions of α and β, we have:
α =
|Q| − |P |
|Q| − |P |
=⇒ |Q| = |P |+
|Q| − |P |
α
=
α|P |+ |Q| − |P |
α
β =
|P |
|P |
=⇒ |P | =
|P |
β
Then, the following expression holds:
|P |
|Q|
=
|P |
β
×
α
α|P |+ |Q| − |P |
=
α|P |
β|Q|+ (α− β)|P |
(1)
We now use expression (1) to infer the fraction of paedophile queries that
were submitted in the KAD P2P network during our experiment. Using the
values from Table 1 and the average values of α and β between our eDonkey
datasets, we obtain:
|P |
|Q|
≈ 0.087%± 0.008
This value is of similar magnitude to the one of eDonkey (approx. 0.25%)
but close to three times lower.
Notice that this estimation of |P |
|Q|
relies on the value of α. One may wonder
whether the choice of keywords from which we built Q \ P has a significant
impact on the estimated value of |P |
|Q|
in KAD. We check this as follows:
we randomly select 1,000 subsets of 26 keywords out of the 53 keywords
which compose the queries in Q \ P . We then compute, for each subset,
the number of queries consisting of exactly one of those keywords and the
resulting value of alpha. For edonkeyFR, we obtain an average value of
α = 0.000889 (minimum: 0.000256, maximum: 0.00153, and 90% of the
values in [0.000463;0.00133]). For edonkeyUA, we obtain an average value
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of α = 0.00105 (minimum: 0.000352, maximum: 0.00172, and 90% of the
values in [0.00062;0.00148]). This means that we would obtain very similar
results with 26 keywords only and so we may be confident in our estimate
obtained with 53 keywords.
6 Conclusion
We performed a first comparative study of two large-scale peer-to-peer net-
works, KAD and eDonkey, with regards to the queries related to child pornog-
raphy. We designed a methodology to collect and process datasets allowing
to compare them in a relevant manner. We obtained the counter-intuitive
result that paedophile keywords are significantly more present in eDonkey
than in KAD, despite the higher anonymity level it provides. On the con-
trary, our study of age indicators in queries showed that the nature of pae-
dophile queries is similar in these systems. We finally established the first
estimate of the fraction of paedophile queries in KAD. We obtained a value
close to 0.09%, which is of the same magnitude but significantly lower than
in eDonkey (0.25%).
Our contributions open various directions for future work. In particular,
our methodology may be applied to compare other systems, and our datasets
may be used to perform either deeper analyses on paedophile activity or on
general search engine behaviors.
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